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Abstract 
Background 
On 11 June the World Health Organization officially raised the phase of 
pandemic alert (with regard to the new H1N1 influenza strain) to level 6. As of 
19 July, 137,232 cases of the H1N1 influenza strain have been officially 
confirmed in 142 different countries, and the pandemic unfolding in the 
Southern hemisphere is now under scrutiny to gain insights about the next 
winter wave in the Northern hemisphere. A major challenge is pre-empted by 
the need to estimate the transmission potential of the virus and to assess its 
dependence on seasonality aspects in order to be able to use numerical 
models capable of projecting the spatiotemporal pattern of the pandemic. 
Methods 
In the present work, we use a global structured metapopulation model 
integrating mobility and transportation data worldwide. The model considers 
data on 3,362 subpopulations in 220 different countries and individual mobility 
across them. The model generates stochastic realizations of the epidemic 
evolution worldwide considering 6 billion individuals, from which we can 
gather information such as prevalence, morbidity, number of secondary cases 
and number and date of imported cases for each subpopulation, all with a 
time resolution of 1 day. In order to estimate the transmission potential and 
the relevant model parameters we used the data on the chronology of the 
2009 novel influenza A(H1N1). The method is based on the maximum 
likelihood analysis of the arrival time distribution generated by the model in 12 
countries seeded by Mexico by using 1 million computationally simulated 
epidemics. An extended chronology including 93 countries worldwide seeded 
before 18 June was used to ascertain the seasonality effects. 
Results 
We found the best estimate R0 = 1.75 (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.64 to 
1.88) for the basic reproductive number. Correlation analysis allows the 
selection of the most probable seasonal behavior based on the observed 
pattern, leading to the identification of plausible scenarios for the future 
unfolding of the pandemic and the estimate of pandemic activity peaks in the 
different hemispheres. We provide estimates for the number of 
hospitalizations and the attack rate for the next wave as well as an extensive 
sensitivity analysis on the disease parameter values. We also studied the 
effect of systematic therapeutic use of antiviral drugs on the epidemic 
timeline. 
Conclusions 
The analysis shows the potential for an early epidemic peak occurring in 
October/November in the Northern hemisphere, likely before large-scale 
vaccination campaigns could be carried out. The baseline results refer to a 
worst-case scenario in which additional mitigation policies are not considered. 
We suggest that the planning of additional mitigation policies such as 
systematic antiviral treatments might be the key to delay the activity peak in 
order to restore the effectiveness of the vaccination programs. 
 
Background 
Estimating the transmission potential of a newly emerging virus is crucial 
when planning for adequate public health interventions to mitigate its spread 
and impact, and to forecast the expected epidemic scenarios through 
sophisticate computational approaches [1-4]. With the current outbreak of the 
new influenza A(H1N1) strain having reached pandemic proportions, the 
investigation of the influenza situation worldwide might provide the key to the 
understanding to the transmissibility observed in different regions and to the 
characterization of possible seasonal behavior. During the early phase of an 
outbreak, this task is hampered by inaccuracies and incompleteness of 
available information. Reporting is constrained by the difficulties in confirming 
large numbers of cases through specific tests and serological analysis. The 
cocirculation of multiple strains, the presence of asymptomatic cases that go 
undetected, the impossibility to monitor mild cases that do not seek health 
care and the possible delays in diagnosis and reporting, all worsen the 
situation. Early modeling approaches and statistical analysis show that the 
number of confirmed cases by the Mexican authorities during the early phase 
was underestimated by a factor ranging from one order of magnitude [5] to 
almost three [6]. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the US estimate a 
5% to 10% case detection, similar to other countries facing large outbreaks, 
with expected heterogeneities due to different surveillance systems. Even 
within the same country, the setup of enhanced monitoring led to improved 
notification with respect to the earlier phase, later relaxed as reporting 
requirements changed [7]. 
 
By contrast, the effort put in place by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and health protection agencies worldwide is providing an unprecedented 
amount of data and, at last, the possibility of following in real time the 
pandemic chronology on the global scale. In particular, the border controls 
and the enhanced surveillance aimed at detecting the first cases reaching 
uninfected countries appear to provide more reliable and timely information 
with respect to the raw count of cases as local transmission occurs, and this 
data has already been used for early assessment of the number of cases in 
Mexico [5]. Moreover, data on international passenger flows from Mexico was 
found to display a strong correlation with confirmed H1N1 importations from 
Mexico [8]. Here we present an estimate of the reproduction number, R0, (that 
is, the average number of secondary cases produced by a primary case [9]) of 
the current H1N1 epidemic based on knowledge of human mobility patterns. 
We use the GLEaM (for GLobal Epidemic and Mobility) structured 
metapopulation model [10] for the worldwide evolution of the pandemic and 
perform a maximum likelihood analysis of the parameters against the actual 
chronology of newly infected countries. The method is computationally 
intensive as it involves a Monte Carlo generation of the distribution of arrival 
time of the infection in each country based on the analysis of 106 worldwide 
simulations of the pandemic evolution with the GLEaM model. The method 
shifts the burden of estimating the disease transmissibility from the 
prevalence data, suffering notification/surveillance biases and dependent on 
country specific surveillance systems, to the more accurate data of early case 
detection in newly affected countries.  
This is achieved through the modeling of human mobility patterns on the 
global level obtained from high quality databases. In other words, the 
chronology of the infection of new countries is determined by two factors. The 
first is the number of cases generated by the epidemic in the originating 
country. The second is the mobility of people from this country to the rest of 
the world. The mobility data are defined from the outset with great accuracy 
and we can therefore find the parameters of the disease spreading as those 
that provide the best fit for the time of infection of new countries. This method 
also allows for uncovering the presence of a seasonal signature in the 
observed pattern, not hindered or effectively caused by notification and 
reporting changes in each country's influenza monitoring. The obtained values 
for the reproduction numbers are larger than the early estimates [5], though 
aligned with later works [11-13]. The simulated geographic and temporal 
evolution of the pandemic based on these estimates predicts an early 
epidemic activity peak in the Northern hemisphere as soon as early/mid 
October. While the simulations refer to a worst-case scenario, with no 
intervention implemented, the present findings pertain to the timing of the 
vaccination campaigns as planned by many countries. For this reason we also 
present an analysis of scenarios in which the systematic use of antiviral drug 
therapy is implemented with varying effectiveness, according to the national 
stockpiles, and study their effect on the epidemic timeline. 
 
Methods 
The GLEaM structured metapopulation model is based on a metapopulation 
approach [4,14-22] in which the world is divided into geographical regions 
defining a subpopulation network where connections among subpopulations 
represent the individual fluxes due to the transportation and mobility 
infrastructure. GLEaM integrates three different data layers [10]. The 
population layer is based on the high-resolution population database of the 
‘Gridded Population of the World’ project of the SocioEconomic Data and 
Applications Center (SEDAC) [23] that estimates the population with a 
granularity given by a lattice of cells covering the whole planet at a resolution 
of 15 ! 15 minutes of arc. The transportation mobility layer integrates air travel 
mobility obtained from the International Air Transport Association (IATA [24]) 
and Official Airline Guide (OAG [25]) databases that contain the list of 
worldwide airport pairs connected by direct flights and the number of available 
seats on any given connection [26]. The combination of the population and 
mobility layers allows the subdivision of the world into georeferenced census 
areas defined with a Voronoi tessellation procedure [27] around transportation 
hubs. These census areas define the subpopulations of the metapopulation 
modeling structure (see Figure 1). In particular, we identify 3,362 
subpopulations centered around IATA airports in 220 different countries (see 
[10] and Additional file 1 for more details). GLEaM integrates short scale 
mobility between adjacent subpopulations by considering commuting patterns 
worldwide as obtained from the data collected and analyzed from more than 
29 countries in 5 continents across the world [10]. Superimposed on these 
layers is the epidemic layer that defines the disease and population dynamics. 
The model simulates the mobility of individuals from one subpopulation to 
another by a stochastic procedure in which the number of passengers of each 
compartment traveling from a subpopulation j to a subpopulation l is an 
integer random variable defined by the actual data from the airline 
transportation database (see Additional file 1). Short range commuting 
between subpopulations is modeled with a time scale separation approach 
that defines the effective force of infections in connected subpopulations 
[10,28,29]. The infection dynamics takes place within each subpopulation and 
assumes the classic influenza-like illness compartmentalization in which each 
individual is classified by a discrete state such as susceptible, latent, 
infectious symptomatic, infectious non-symptomatic or permanently 
recovered/removed [9,30]. The model therefore assumes that the latent 
period is equivalent to the incubation period and that no secondary 
transmissions occur during the incubation period (see Figure 1 for a detailed 
description of the compartmentalization). All transitions are modeled through 
binomial and multinomial processes to preserve the discrete and stochastic 
nature of the processes (see Additional file 1 for the full description). 
Asymptomatic individuals are considered as a fraction pa = 33% of the 
infectious individuals [31] generated in the model and assumed to infect with a 
relative infectiousness of r! = 50% [5,30,32]. Change in traveling behavior 
after the onset of symptoms is modeled with the probability 1 - pt , set to 50%, 
that individuals would stop traveling when ill [30]. The spreading rate of the 
disease is ultimately governed by the basic reproduction number R0. Once the 
disease parameters and initial conditions based on available data are defined, 
GLEaM allows the generation of stochastic realizations of the worldwide 
unfolding of the epidemic, with mobility processes entirely based on real data. 
The model generates in silico epidemics for which we can gather information 
such as prevalence, morbidity, number of secondary cases, number of 
imported cases and other quantities for each subpopulation and with a time 
resolution of 1 day. While global models are generally used to produce 
scenarios in which the basic disease parameters are defined from the outset, 
here we use the model to provide a maximum likelihood estimate of the 
transmission potential by finding the set of disease parameters that best fit the 
data on the arrival time of cases in different countries worldwide. It is 
important to stress that the model is not an agent-based model and does not 
include additional structure within a subpopulation, therefore it cannot provide 
detailed information at the level of households or workplaces. The projections 
for the winter season in the northern hemisphere are also assuming that there 
will be no mutation of the virus with respect to the spring/summer of 2009. 
Furthermore, while at the moment the novel H1N1 influenza is accounting for 
75% of the influenza cases worldwide, the model does not consider the 
cocirculation of different influenza strains and cannot provide information on 
cocirculation data. 
 
The initial conditions of the epidemic are defined by setting the onset of the 
outbreak near La Gloria in Mexico on 18 February 2009, as reported by 
official sources [33] and analogously to other works [5]. We tested different 
localizations of the first cases in census areas close to La Gloria without 
observing relevant variations with respect to the observed results. We also 
performed sensitivity analysis on the starting date by selecting a seeding date 
anticipated or delayed by 1 week with respect to the date available in official 
reports [33]. The arrival time of infected individuals in the countries seeded by 
Mexico is clearly a combination of the number of cases present in the 
originating country (Mexico) and the mobility network, both within Mexico and 
connecting Mexico with countries abroad. For this reason we integrated into 
our model the data on Mexico-US border commuting (see Figure 2a), which 
could be relevant in defining the importation of cases in the US, along with 
Mexican internal commuting patterns (see Figure 1) that are responsible for 
the diffusion of the disease from rural areas as La Gloria to transportation 
hubs such as Mexico City. In addition, we used a time-dependent modification 
of the reproductive number in Mexico as in [6] to model the control measures 
implemented in the country starting 24 April and ending 10 May, as those 
might affect the spread to other countries. 
 
In order to ascertain the effect of seasonality on the observed pattern, we 
explored different seasonality schemes. The seasonality is modeled by a 
standard forcing that rescales the value of the basic reproductive number into 
a seasonally rescaled reproductive number, R(t), depending on time. The 
seasonal rescaling is time and location dependent by means of a scaling 
multiplicative factor generated by a sinusoidal function with a total period of 12 
months oscillating in the range "min to "max, with "max = 1.1 (sensitivity 
analysis in the range 1.0 to 1.1) and "min a free parameter to be estimated 
[17]. The rescaling function is in opposition in the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres (see Additional file 1 for details). No rescaling is assumed in the 
Tropics. The value of R0 reported in the Tables and the definition of the 
baseline is the reference value in the Tropics. In each subpopulation the R(t) 
relative to the corresponding geographical location and time of the year is 
used in the simulations. 
 
The seasonal transmission potential of the H1N1 strain is assessed in a two-
step process that first estimates the reproductive number in the Tropics 
region, where seasonality is assumed not to occur, by focusing on the early 
international seeding by Mexico, and then estimates the degree of seasonal 
dumping factor by examining a longer time period of international spread to 
allow for seasonal changes. The estimation of the reproductive number is 
performed through a maximum likelihood analysis of the model fitting the data 
of the early chronology of the H1N1 epidemic. Given a set of values of the 
disease parameters, we produced 2 ! 103 stochastic realizations of the 
pandemic evolution worldwide for each R0 value. Our model explicitly takes 
into account the class of symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals (see 
Figure 1) and allows the tracking of the importation of each symptomatic 
individual and of the onset of symptoms of exposed individuals transitioning to 
the symptomatic class, as observables of the simulations. This allows us to 
obtain numerically with a Monte Carlo procedure the probability distribution 
Pi(ti) of the importation of the first infected individual or the first occurrence of 
the onset of symptoms for an individual in each country i at time ti. 
Asymptomatic individuals do not contribute to the definition of ti. With the aim 
of working with conditional independent variables we restrict the likelihood 
analysis to 12 countries seeded from Mexico (see Figure 2b) and for which it 
is possible to know with good confidence the onset of symptoms and/or the 
arrival date of the first detected case (see Tables and data sources in 
Additional file 1). This allows us to define a likelihood function L = #i Pi(ti
*), 
where ti
* is the empirical arrival time from the H1N1 chronological history in 
each of the selected countries. This methodology assumes the prompt 
detection of symptomatic cases at the very beginning of the outbreak in a 
given country, and for this reason we have also provided a sensitivity analysis 
accounting for a late/missed detection of symptomatic individuals as reported 
in the next section. The transmission potential is estimated as the value of R0 
that maximizes the likelihood function L, for a given set of values of the 
disease parameters. In Table 1 we report the reference values assumed for 
some of the model parameters and the range explored with the sensitivity 
analysis. So far there are no precise clinical estimates of the basic model 
parameters $ and µ defining the inverse average exposed and infectious time 
durations [34-36]. The generation interval Gt [37,38] used in the literature is 
based on the early estimate of [5] and values obtained for previous pandemic 
and seasonal influenza [4,30-32,39,40], with most studies focusing on values 
ranging from 2 to 4 days [5,11-13]. We have therefore assumed a short 
exposed period value $-1 = 1.1 as indicated by early estimates [5] and 
compatible with recent studies on seasonal influenza [31,41] and performed a 
sensitivity analysis for values as large as $-1 = 2.5. The maximum likelihood 
procedure is performed by systematically exploring different values of the 
generation time aimed at providing a best estimate and confidence interval for 
Gt, along with the estimation of the maximum likelihood value of R0. 
 
The major problem in the case of projections on an extended time horizon is 
the seasonality effect that in the long run is crucial in determining the peak of 
the epidemic. In order to quantify the degree of seasonality observed in the 
current epidemic, we estimate the minimum seasonality scaling factor "min of 
the sinusoidal forcing by extending the chronology under study and analyzing 
the whole data set composed of the arrival dates of the first infected case in 
the 93 countries affected by the outbreak as of 18 June. We studied the 
correlation between the simulated arrival time by country and its 
corresponding empirical value, by measuring the regression coefficient 
between the two datasets. Given the extended time frame under observation, 
the arrival times considered in this case are expected to provide a signature of 
the presence of seasonality. They included the seeding of new countries from 
outbreaks taking place in regions where seasonal effects might occur, as for 
example in the US or in the UK. For the simulated arrival times we have 
considered the median and 95% confidence interval (CI) emerging from the 2 
! 103 stochastic runs. The regression coefficient is found to be sensitive to 
variations in the seasonality scaling factor, allowing discrimination of the "min 
value that best fits the real epidemic. A detailed presentation of this analysis is 
reported in Additional file 1. The full exploration of the phase space of 
epidemic parameters and seasonality scenarios reported in Additional file 1 
required data from 106 simulations; the equivalent of 2 million minutes of 
PowerPC 970 2,500 MHz CPU time. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 reports the results of the maximum likelihood procedure and of the 
correlation analysis on the arrival times for the estimation of "min. In the 
following we consider as the baseline case the set of parameters defined by 
the best estimates: Gt = 3.6 days, µ
-1 = 2.5 days, R0 = 1.75. 
The best estimates for Gt and R0 are higher than those obtained in early 
findings but close to subsequent analysis on local outbreaks [11-13]. The R0 
we report is the reference value for Mexico and the tropical region, whereas in 
each country we have to consider the R(t) due to the seasonality rescaling 
depending on the time of the year, as shown in Table 2. This might explain 
the lower values found in some early analysis in the US. The transmission 
potential emerging from our analysis is close to estimates for previous 
pandemics [14,42]. In Additional file 1 we provide supplementary tables for 
the full sensitivity analysis concerning the assumptions used in the model. 
Results show that larger values of the generation interval provide increasing 
estimates for R0. Fixing the latency period to $
-1 = 1.1 days and varying the 
mean infectious period in the plausible range 1.1 to 4.0 days yields 
corresponding maximum likelihood estimates for R0 in the range 1.4 to 2.1.  
Variations in the latency period from $-1 = 1.1 to $-1 = 2.5 provide 
corresponding best estimates for R0 in the range 1.9 to 2.3, if we assume an 
infectious period of 3 days. We tested variations of the compartmental model 
parameters pa, and pt up to 20% and explored the range r! = 20% to 80%, and 
sensitivity on the value of the maximum seasonality scaling factor  "max in the 
range 1.0 to 1.1. The obtained estimates lie within the confidence intervals of 
the best estimate values. 
 
The empirical arrival time data used for the likelihood analysis are necessarily 
an overestimation of the actual date of the importation of cases as cases 
could go undetected. If we assume a shift of 7 days earlier for all arrival times 
available from official reports, the resulting maximum likelihood is increasing 
the best estimate for R0 to 1.87 (95% CI 1.73 to 2.01), as expected since 
earlier case importation necessitates a larger growth rate of the epidemic. The 
official timeline used here therefore provides, all other parameters being 
equal, a lower estimate of the transmission potential. We have also explored 
the use of a subset of the 12 countries, always generating results within the 
confidence interval of the best estimate. 
 
The best estimates reported in Table 1 do not show an observable 
dependence on the assumption about the seasonality scenario (as reported in 
Additional file 1). The analysis is restricted to the first countries seeded from 
Mexico to preserve the conditional independence of the variables and it is 
natural to see the lack of any seasonal signature since these countries 
receive the disease from a single country, mostly found in the tropical region 
where no seasonal effects are expected. 
 
In order to find the minimum seasonality scaling factor "min that best fits the 
empirical data, we performed a statistical correlation analysis of the arrival 
time of the infection in the 93 countries infected as of 18 June, as detailed in 
the Methods section and Additional file 1. By considering a larger number of 
countries and a longer period for the unfolding of the epidemic worldwide as 
seasons change, the correlation analysis for the baseline scenario provides 
clear statistical indications for a minimum rescaling factor in the interval 0.6 < 
"min < 0.7. In the full range of epidemic parameters explored, the correlation 
analysis yields values for "min in the range 0.4 to 0.9. This evidence for a mild 
seasonality rescaling is consistent with the activity observed in the months of 
June and July in Europe and the US where the epidemic progression has not 
stopped and the number of cases keeps increasing considerably (see also 
Table 2 for the corresponding values of R(t) in those regions during summer 
months). 
 This analysis allows us to provide a comparison with the epidemic activity 
observed so far, and most importantly an early assessment of the future 
unfolding of the epidemics. For each set of parameters the model generates 
quantities of interest such as the profile of the epidemic behavior in each 
subpopulation or the number of imported cases. Each simulation generates a 
stochastic realization of the process and the curves are the statistical 
aggregate of at least 2 ! 103 realizations. In the following we report the 
median profiles and where indicated the 95% CI. For the sake of clarity data 
are aggregated at the level of country or geographical region. Additional file 1 
reports a detailed comparison of the simulated number of cases in Australia, 
US, UK with the reported cases from official sources in the period May to July. 
Results are in good agreement with the reported temporal evolution of the 
epidemic and highlight a progressive decrease of the monitoring activity 
caused by the increasing number of cases, as expected [7]. The same 
information is also available for each single subpopulation defined in the 
model. We have therefore tested the model results in four territories of 
Australia. Interestingly, the model is able to recover the different timing 
observed in the four territories. A detailed discussion of this comparison is 
reported in Additional file 1. 
 
In Figure 2c-d we report the predicted baseline case profiles for countries in 
the Southern hemisphere. It is possible to observe in the figure that in this 
case, the effect of seasonality is not discriminating between different waves, 
as the short time interval from the start of the outbreak to the winter season in 
the Southern hemisphere does not allow a large variation in the rescaling of 
the transmissibility during these months. Therefore we predict a first wave that 
occurs between August and September in phase with the seasonal influenza 
pattern, and independently of the seasonality parameter "min. The situation is 
expected to be different in the Northern hemisphere where different 
seasonality parameters might progressively shift the peak of the epidemic 
activity in the winter months. Figure 2e reports the predicted daily incidence 
profiles for the Northern hemisphere and the 95% CI for the activity peaks of 
the pandemic with the best-fit seasonality scenario (that is, the range 0.6 < 
"min < 0.7). Table 3 reports the same information for different continental 
areas. The general evidence clearly points to the occurrence of an 
autumn/winter wave in the Northern hemisphere strikingly earlier than 
expected, with peak times ranging from early October to the middle of 
November. The peak estimate for each geographical area is obtained from 
the epidemic profile summing up all subpopulations belonging to the region. 
The activity peak estimate for each single country can be noticeably different 
from the overall estimate of the corresponding geographical region as more 
populated areas may dominate the estimate for a given area. For instance 
Chile has a pandemic activity peak in the interval 1 July – 6 August, one 
month earlier than the average peak estimate for the Lower South America 
geographical area it belongs to. It is extremely important to remark that in the 
whole phase space of parameters explored the peak time for the epidemic 
activity in the Northern hemisphere lies in the range late September to late 
November, thus suggesting that the early seasonal peak is a genuine feature 
induced by the epidemic data available so far. 
 
In Table 4 we report the new number of cases at the activity peak and the 
epidemic size as of 15 October for a selected number of countries. As shown 
by the results in the table, the implementation of a massive vaccination 
campaign starting in October or November, with no additional mitigation 
implemented, would be too late with respect to the epidemic evolution, and 
could therefore be expected to be rather ineffective in reducing transmission. 
This makes a strong case for prioritized vaccination programs focusing on 
high-risk groups and healthcare and social infrastructures workers. In order to 
assess the amount of pressure on the healthcare infrastructure, in Table 5 we 
provide the expected number of hospitalizations at the epidemic peak 
according to different hospitalization rate estimates. The assessment of the 
hospitalization rate is very difficult as it depends on the ratio between the 
number of hospitalizations and the actual number of infected people. As 
discussed previously, the number of confirmed cases released by official 
agencies is always a crude underestimate of the actual number of infected 
people. We consider three different methods along the lines of those 
developed for the analysis of fatalities due to the new virus [43]. The first 
assumes the average value of hospitalization observed during the regular 
seasonal influenza season. The second is a multiplier method in which the 
hospitalization rate is obtained as the ratio between the WHO number of 
confirmed hospitalizations and the cases confirmed by the WHO multiplied by 
a factor 10 to 30 to account for underreporting. The third method is given by 
the ratio of the total number of confirmed hospitalizations and the total number 
of confirmed cases. This number is surely a gross overestimation of the 
hospitalization rate [43,44]. It has to be noted that hospitalizations are often 
related to existing health conditions, age and other risk factors. This implies 
that hospitalizations will likely not affect the population homogenously, a factor 
that we cannot consider in our model. 
 
The number of hospitalized at peak times in the selected countries range 
between 2 and 40 per 100,000 persons, for a hospitalization rate typical of 
seasonal influenza and for an assumed 1% rate, respectively, yielding a 
quantitative indication of the potential burden that the health care systems will 
likely face at the peak of the epidemic activity in the next few months. It is 
worth noting that the present analysis considers a worst-case scenario in 
which no effective containment measures are introduced. This is surely not 
the case in that pandemic plans and mitigation strategies are considered at 
the national and international level. Guidelines aimed at increasing social 
distancing and the isolation of cases will be crucial in trying to mitigate and 
delay the spread in the community, thus reducing the overwhelming requests 
on the hospital systems. Most importantly, the mass vaccination of a large 
fraction of the population would strongly alter the presented picture. By 
contrast, any mass vaccination campaign is unlikely to start before the middle 
of October [45,46]. The potential for an early activity peak of the pandemic in 
October/November puts at risk the effectiveness of any mass vaccination 
program that might take place too late with respect to the pandemic wave in 
the Northern hemisphere. In this case it is natural to imagine the use of other 
mitigation strategies aimed at delaying the activity peak so that the maximum 
benefit can be gained with the vaccination program. As an example, we 
studied the implementation of systematic antiviral (AV) treatment and its effect 
in delaying the activity peak [19,30,32,39,47-50]. The resulting effects are 
clearly country specific in that each country will experience a different timing 
for the epidemic peak (with a local transmissibility increasing in value as we 
approach the winter months) and will count on antiviral stockpiles of different 
sizes. Here we consider the implementation of the AV treatment in all 
countries in the world that have drugs stockpiles available (source data from 
[51,52] and national agencies), until the exhaustion of their stockpiles [4]. We 
have modeled this mitigation policy with a conservative therapeutic successful 
use of drugs for 30% of symptomatic infectious individuals. The efficacy of the 
AV is accounted in the model by a 60% reduction in the transmissibility of the 
disease of an infected person under AV treatment when AV drugs are 
administered in a timely fashion [30,32]. We assume that the drugs are 
administered within 1 day of the onset of symptoms. We also consider that the 
AV treatment reduces the infectious period by 1 day [30,32]. In Figure 3 we 
show the delay obtained with the implementation of the AV treatment protocol 
in a subset of countries with available stockpiles. As an example, we also 
show the incidence profiles for the cases of Spain and Germany, where it is 
possible to achieve a delay of about 4 weeks with the use of 5 million and 10 
million courses of AV, respectively. The results of this mitigation might be 
extremely valuable in providing the necessary time for the implementation of 
the mass vaccination program. 
 
Conclusions 
We have defined a Monte Carlo likelihood analysis for the assessment of the 
seasonal transmission potential of the new A(H1N1) influenza based on the 
analysis of the chronology of case detection in affected countries at the early 
stage of the epidemic. This method allows the use of data coming from the 
border controls and the enhanced surveillance aimed at detecting the first 
cases reaching uninfected countries. This data is, in principle, more reliable 
than the raw count of cases provided by countries during the evolution of the 
epidemic. The procedure provides the necessary input to the large-scale 
computational model for the analysis of the unfolding of the pandemic in the 
future months. The analysis shows the potential for an early activity peak that 
strongly emphasizes the need for detailed planning for additional intervention 
measures, such as social distancing and antiviral drugs use, to delay the 
epidemic activity peak and thus increase the effectiveness of the subsequent 
vaccination effort. 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1 
Schematic illustration of the GLobal Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) 
model. Top: census and mobility layers that define the subpopulations and 
the various types of mobility among those (commuting patterns and air travel 
flows). The same resolution is used worldwide. Bottom: compartmental 
structure in each subpopulation. A susceptible individual in contact with a 
symptomatic or asymptomatic infectious person contracts the infection at rate 
! or r!! [30,32], respectively, and enters the latent compartment where he is 
infected but not yet infectious. At the end of the latency period, each latent 
individual becomes infectious, entering the symptomatic compartments with 
probability 1 - pa or becoming asymptomatic with probability pa [30,32]. The 
symptomatic cases are further divided between those who are allowed to 
travel (with probability pt) and those who would stop traveling when ill (with 
probability 1 - pt) [30]. Infectious individuals recover permanently with rate µ. 
All transition processes are modeled through multinomial processes. 
Figure 2. 
Illustration of the model’s initialization and the results for the activity 
peaks in three geographical areas. (a) Intensity of the commuting between 
US and Mexico at the border of the two countries. (b) The 12 countries 
infected from Mexico used in the Monte Carlo likelihood analysis. The color 
scale of the arrows from red to yellow indicates the time ordering of the 
epidemic invasion. Panels (c), (d) and (e) show the daily incidence in Lower 
South America, South Pacific and North America/Western Europe, 
respectively. The shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval (CI) of 
the peak time in the corresponding geographical region. The median 
incidence profiles of selected countries are shown for the two values defining 
the best-fit seasonality scaling factor interval. 
Figure 3 
Delay effect induced by the use of antiviral drugs for treatment with 30% 
case detection and drug administration. (a) Peak times of the epidemic 
activity in the worst-case scenario (black) and in the scenario where antiviral 
treatment is considered (red), for a set of countries in the Northern 
hemisphere. The intervals correspond to the 95% confidence interval (CI) of 
the peak time for the two values defining the best-fit seasonality scaling factor 
interval. (b,c) Incidence profiles for Spain and Germany in the worst-case 
scenario (black) and in the scenario where antiviral treatment is considered 
(red). Results are shown for "min = 0.6 only, for the sake of visualization. A 
delay of about 4 weeks results from the implemented mitigation. 
 
Table 1. Best Estimates of the epidemiological parameters 
Parameter Best Estimate Interval estimate(a) Description 
R0 1.75 1.64 to 1.88 
Basic reproduction 
number  
Gt 3.6 2.2 to 5.1 
Mean generation time 
(days) 
µ
-1 2.5 1.1 to 4.0 
Mean infectious 
period (days) 
"min 0.65 0.6 to 0.7 
Minimal seasonality 
rescaling 
Assumed values: 
 
Assumed value at 
best estimate 
Sensitivity analysis 
range  
$
-1 1.1 1.1 to 2.5 
Mean exposed period 
(days) 
"max 1.1 1.0 to 1.1 
Maximum seasonality 
rescaling 
Estimates from the Monte Carlo likelihood analyses for various values of the 
parameter space explored. In Additional file 1 we report the complete tables 
corresponding to the sensitivity analysis. (a) For R0, we report the 95% 
Confidence Interval. Gt, µ
-1 intervals are defined by the range of plausible 
constrained values sampled in the Monte Carlo approach that satisfy a 
likelihood ratio test at the 5% level. The "min interval is the best-fit range within 
the minimal resolution allowed by the Montecarlo sampling. 
 
Table 2. Seasonality time-dependent reproduction number in the 
Northern hemisphere 
Month R(t) in Northern hemisphere 
May 1.19 to 1.49 
June 1.07 to 1.33 
July 1.05 to 1.24 
August 1.07 to 1.33 
September 1.19 to 1.49 
The values of R(t) for the Northern hemisphere correspond to the rescaling of 
the maximum likelihood value of R0 in Mexico and in the Tropical regions (R0 
= 1.75) and the best values for the seasonality rescaling factor, 0.6 < "min < 
0.7. The parameter "min indicates the minimum value of the seasonal 
rescaling of R0 induced by the sinusoidal forcing in the Northern hemisphere 
[17]. 
 Table 3. Peak times 
Region Estimated activity peak time 
North America 25 September to 9 November 
Western Europe 14 October to 21 November 
Lower South America 30 July to 6 September 
South Pacific 28 July to 17 September 
The table reports the 95% confidence interval (CI) for the pandemic activity 
peak time for geographical areas in the Northern and Southern hemispheres 
estimated for the best-fit seasonality scaling interval, 0.6 < "min < 0.7, and for 
the maximum likelihood value of R0 found for the baseline parameters, R0 = 
1.75. The confidence interval is obtained from the set of numerical 
observations of the peak time in a given region obtained from the 2,000 
stochastic runs of the model. In Additional file 1 we report the results for the 
full sensitivity analysis. In all cases we obtain activity peak time intervals close 
to those reported for the baseline scenario. Peak time estimates in this table 
are obtained from the epidemic profile of the entire geographical region. 
Single country belonging to each region could have different peak time 
estimates (see text).  
Table 4: Daily new number of cases and epidemic sizes in several countries 
Epidemic size at 15 October 
(% of population) 
Country Peak time 
New daily cases 
at the peak time 
(thousands) 
New daily 
cases at the 
peak time (% 
of population) !min 0.6 !min 0.7 
United States 24 September to 9 November 2,983 to 3,302 1.06 to 1.17 4.99 to 7.38 23.76 to 29.96 
Canada 4 October to 14 November 331 to 373 1.04 to 1.17 2.28 to 4.56 16.90 to 27.41 
United Kingdom 9 October to 18 November 723 to 813 1.21 to 1.36 1.77 to 4.45 11.11 to 27.29 
France 12 October to 21 November 725 to 792 1.26 to 1.38 1.83 to 3.87 10.86 to 26.40 
Germany 11 October to 20 November 1,162 to 1,291 1.43 to 1.59 1.02 to 2.41 8.57 to 26.25 
Italy 17 October to 23 November 793 to 867 1.39 to 1.52 0.93 to 2.20 6.71 to 22.13 
Spain 8 October to 19 November  492 to 536 1.23 to 1.34 2.39 to 3.70 13.26 to 27.95 
China 8 November to 11 December 14,077 to 16,207 1.16 to 1.34 0.65 to 5.34 1.51 to 9.49 
Japan 13 October to 16 November 1,539 to 1,822 1.21 to 1.43 1.47 to 4.86 5.84 to 24.65 
Peak times of the epidemic activity, daily new number of cases predicted at peak time and % of the population, and epidemic size 
on 15 October are shown. Intervals refer to the 95% confidence interval (CI). After 1 year from the start of the epidemic the 
percentage of total population infected is close to 45% with small differences of the order of 5% across different countries. 
 
 Table 5. Number of hospitalizations per 100,000 persons at the activity 
peak in several countries 
HR based on multiplier 
method 
 
HR based on 
seasonal 
influenza, 
0.08% 
0.3% 1% 
HR based on 
WHO confirmed 
cases, 10% 
USA 2.21 8.28 27.58 275.84 
Canada 2.18 8.17 27.22 272.23 
UK 2.52 9.45 31.52 315.15 
France 2.61 9.79 32.64 326.40 
Germany 2.98 11.17 37.22 372.18 
Italy 2.87 10.76 35.87 358.67 
Spain 2.54 9.54 31.81 318.12 
China 2.48 9.32 31.05 310.50 
Japan 2.59 9.70 32.32 323.19 
The estimates are obtained by considering three methods. The first assumes 
the average hospitalization rate (HR) observed during the seasonal influenza 
season. The second is a simple multiplier method in which the HR is obtained 
as the ratio between the World Health organization (WHO) number of 
confirmed hospitalizations and the cases confirmed by the WHO multiplied by 
a factor 10 to 30 to account for underreporting. The third method is simply the 
ratio of the total number of confirmed hospitalizations and the total number of 
confirmed cases. 
 
Additional files 
Additional file 1 
File format: PDF 
Title: Additional information. 
Description: The file provides details on the model and all the statistical and 
sensitivity analysis carried out in the preparation of this work. The file also 
contains references to all data sources used in the preparation of this work. 
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1 Structured metapopulation model
Here we present the detailed definition and data description of the global structured metapopu-
lation model. The computational model is based on three data/model layers. The first layer is
a data layer defining the census area and the subpopulation structure. The second one refers to
human mobility model defined by the transportation and commuting networks characterizing the
interactions and exchanges of individuals across subpopulations. The third layer is the epidemic
dynamic model that defines the evolution of the infectious disease inside each subpopulations.
1.1 Global Population and subpopulations definition
The population dataset was obtained from the Web sites of the "Gridded Population of the World"
and the "Global Urban-Rural Mapping" projects [1, 2], which are run by the Socioeconomic Data
and Application Center (SEDAC) of Columbia University. The surface of the world is divided
into a grid of cells that can have different resolution levels. Each of these cells has assigned an
estimated population value.
Out of the possible resolutions, we have opted for cells of 15 × 15 minutes of arc to constitute
the basis of our model. This corresponds to an area of each cell approximately equivalent to a
rectangle of 25×25 kms along the Equator. The dataset comprises 823 680 cells, of which 250 206 are
populated. Since the coordinates of each cell center and those of the WAN airports are known, the
distance between the cells and the airports can be calculated. We have performed a Voronoi-like
tessellation of the Earth surface assigning each cell to the closest airport that satisfies the following
two conditions: (i) Each cell is assigned to the closest airport within the same country. And (ii),
the distance between the airport and the cell cannot be longer than 200 kms. This cutoff naturally
emerges from the distribution of distances between cells and closest airports, and it is introduced
to avoid that in barely populated areas such as Siberia we can generate geographical census areas
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Figure 1: Population database and Voronoi tessellation around main tranportation hubs. The
world surface is represented in a grid-like partition where each cell - corresponding to a popula-
tion estimate - is assigned to the closest airport. Geographical census areas emerge that constitute
the sub-populations of the meta-population model.
thousands of kilometer wide but with almost no population. It also corresponds to a reasonable
upper cutoff for the ground traveling distance expected to be covered to reach an airport before
traveling by plane.
Before proceeding with the tessellation, we need to take into account that some urban areas
include more than one airport. For instance, London has up to six airport, Paris has two, and
New York City has three. Our aim is to build a metapopulation model whose subpopulations
correspond to the geographical census areas obtained from tessellation. Inside these geographical
census areas a homogeneous mixing is assumed. The groups of airports that serve the same urban
area need therefore to be aggregated since the mixing within the given urban area is expected to
be high and cannot be represented in terms of separated subpopulations for each of the airports
serving the same city. We have searched for groups of airports located close to each other and we
manually processed the identified groups of airports to select those belonging to the same urban
area. The airports of the same group are then aggregated in a single "super-hub". An example
with the final result of the Voronoi tessellation procedure with cells and airports can be seen in
Figure 1. The geographical census areas become thus the basic subpopulations of our metapop-
ulation model. Their connections will determine the geographical spreading of an hypothetical
epidemic. The air transportation is already integrated in the model, but a further step must be
taken in order to also include ground transportation in a realistic way.
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Table 1: Commuting networks in each continent. Number of countries (Nc), number of adminis-
trative units (V) and inter-links between them (E) are summarized.
Continent Nc V E
Europe 17 65880 4490650
North America 2 6986 182255
Latin America 4 1858 63678
Asia 3 2732 323815
Oceania 2 746 30679
Total 28 78202 5091077
1.2 World Airport Network
TheWorld Airport Network (WAN) is composed of 3362 commercial airports indexed by the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) that are located in 220 different countries. The database
contains the number of available seats per year for each direct connection between two of these
airports. The coverage of the dataset is estimated to be 99% of the global commercial traffic. The
WAN can be seen as a weighted graph comprising 16 846 edges whose weight,ωjℓ, represents the
passenger flow between airports j and ℓ. The network shows a high degree of heterogeneity both in
the number of destinations per airport and in the number of passengers per connection [3, 4, 5, 6].
1.3 Commuting Networks
Our commuting databases have been collected from the Offices of Statistics of 28 countries in the 5
populated continents. The full dataset comprehends more than 78 000 administrative regions and
over five million commuting flow connections between them (see [7]). The definition of adminis-
trative unit and the granularity level at which the commuting data are provided enormously vary
from country to country. For example, most European countries adhere to a practice that ranks ad-
ministrative divisions in terms of geocoding for statistical purposes, the so called Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Most countries in the European Union are partitioned into
three NUTS levels which usually range from states to provinces. The commuting data at this level
of resolution is therefore strongly coarse-grained. In order to have a higher geographical resolu-
tion of the commuting datasets that could match the resolution scale of our geographical census
areas, we looked for smaller local administrative units (LAU) in Europe. The US or Canada report
commuting at the level of counties. However, even within a single country the actual extension,
shape, and population of the administrative divisions are usually a consequence of historical rea-
sons and can be strongly heterogeneous.
Such heterogeneity renders the efforts to define a universal law describing commuting flows
likely to fail. The mobility behavior might indeed result different across countries simply due to
the country specific partition of the population into administrative boundaries. In order to over-
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come this problem, and in particular to define a data-driven short range commuting for GLEaM,
we used the geographical census areas obtained from the Voronoi tessellation as the elementary
units to define the centers of gravity for the process of commuting. This allows to deal with self-
similar units across the world wth respect to mobility as emerged from a tessellation around main
hubs of mobility and not country specific administrative boundaries.
We have therefore mapped the different levels of commuting data into the geographical census
areas formed by the Voronoi-like tessellation procedure described above. The mapped commuting
flows can be seen as a second transport network connecting subpopulations that are geographi-
cally close. This second network can be overlayed to the WAN in a multi-scale fashion to simulate
realistic scenarios for disease spreading. The network exhibits important variability in the number
of commuters on each connection as well as in the total number of commuters per geographical
census area. Being the census areas relatively homogeneous and self-similar allows us to estimate
a gravity law that successfully reproduce the commuting data obtained across different continents,
and provide us with estimations for the possible commuting levels in the countries for which such
data is not available as in ref. [7].
1.4 Epidemic dynamic model
Each geographical census area corresponds to a subpopulation in the metapopulation model, in-
side which we consider a Susceptible-Latent-Infectious-Recovered (SLIR) compartmental scheme,
typical of influenza-like illnesses (ILIs), where each individual has a discrete disease state assigned
at each moment in time. In Fig. 2, a diagram of the compartmental structure with transitions be-
tween compartments is shown. The contagion process, i.e. generation of new infections, is the
only transition mechanism which is altered by short-range mobility, whereas all the other transi-
tions between compartments are spontaneous and remain unaffected by the commuting. The rate
at which a susceptible individual in subpopulation j acquires the infection, the so called force of in-
fection λj, is determined by interactions with infectious persons either in the home subpopulation
j or in its neighboring subpopulations on the commuting network.
Given the force of infection λj in subpopulation j, each person in the susceptible compart-
ment (Sj) contracts the infection with probability λj∆t and enters the latent compartment (Lj),
where ∆t is the time interval considered. Latent individuals exit the compartment with proba-
bility ε∆t, and transit to asymptomatic infectious compartment (Iaj ) with probability pa or, with
the complementary probability 1 − pa, become symptomatic infectious. Infectious persons with
symptoms are further divided between those who can travel (Itj ), probability pt, and those who
are travel-restricted (Intj ) with probability 1 − pt. All the infectious persons permanently recover
with probability µ∆t, entering the recovered compartment (Rj) in the next time step. All transi-
tions and corresponding rates are summarized in Table 2 and in Figure 2. In each subpopulation
the variation of the number of individuals in each compartment [m] can be written at any given
time step as
X
[m]
j (t+ ∆t) − X
[m]
j (t) = ∆X
[m]
j +Ωj([m]) (1)
where the term ∆X[m]j represents the change due to the compartment transitions induced by the
disease dynamics and the transport operatorΩj([m]) represents the variations due to the traveling
and mobility of individuals. The latter operator takes into account the long-range airline mobility
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Figure 2: Compartmental structure of our epidemic model within each subpopulation.
and define the minimal time scale of integration to 1 day. The mobility due to the commuting
flows is taken into account by defining effective force of infections by using a time scale separation
approximations as detailed in the following sections.
The threshold parameter of the disease that determines the spreading rate of infection is called
basic reproduction number (R0), and is defined as the average number of infected cases generated
by a typical infectious individual when introduced into a fully susceptible population [8]. For our
compartmental model we have R0 = βµ−1[1− pa + rβpa].
1.5 Stochastic and discrete integration of the disease dynamics
In each subpopulation j, we define an operator acting on a compartment [m] to account for all the
transitions out of the compartment in the time interval ∆t. Each element풟j([m], [n]) of this opera-
tor is a random variable extracted from a multinomial distribution and determines the number of
transitions from compartment [m] to [n] occurring in ∆t. The change ∆X[m]j of a compartment [m]
in this time interval is given by a sum over all random variables {풟j([m], [n])} as follows
∆X
[m]
j =
∑
[n]
{−풟j([m], [n]) +풟j([n], [m])} . (2)
As a concrete example let us consider the evolution of the latent compartment. There are three
possible transitions from the compartment: transitions to the asymptomatic infectious, the symp-
tomatic traveling and the non-traveling infectious compartments. The elements of the operator
Seasonal transmission potential and activity peaks of the new influenza A(H1N1)...
D Balcan, H Hu, B Goncalves, P Bajardi, C Poletto
JJ Ramasco, D Paolotti, N Perra, M Tizzoni, W Van den Broeck, V Colizza, A Vespignani 6
Table 2: Transitions between compartments and their rates.
Transition Type Rate
Sj → Lj Contagion λj
Lj → Iaj Spontaneous εpa
Lj → Itj " ε(1− pa)pt
Lj → Intj " ε(1− pa)(1− pt)
Iaj → Rj " µ
Itj → Rj " µ
Intj → Rj " µ
acting on Lj are extracted from the multinomial distribution
PrMultin(Lj(t), pLj→Iaj , pLj→Itj , pL→Intj ) (3)
determined by the transition probabilities
pLj→Iaj = εpa∆t ,
pLj→Itj = ε(1− pa)pt∆t , (4)
pL→Int
j
= ε(1− pa)(1− pt)∆t ,
and by the number of individuals in the compartment Lj(t) (its size). All these transitions cause
a reduction in the size of the compartment. The increase in the compartment population is due
to the transitions from susceptibles into latents. This is also a random number extracted from a
binomial distribution
PrBin(Sj(t), pSj→Lj) (5)
given by the chance of contagion
pSj→Lj = λj∆t , (6)
with a number of attempts given by the number of susceptibles Sj(t). After extracting these num-
bers from the appropriate multinomial distributions, we can calculate the change ∆Lj(t) as
∆Lj(t) = Lj(t+ 1) − Lj(t) = −
[풟j(L, Ia) +풟j(L, It) +풟j(L, Int)]+풟j(S, L) . (7)
1.6 The integration of the transport operator
The transport operator is defined by the airline transportation data and sets the integration time
scale to 1 day. The number of individuals in the compartment [m] traveling from the subpopula-
tion j to the subpopulation ℓ is an integer random variable, in that each of the Xj potential travelers
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has a probability pjℓ = wjℓ/Nj to go from j to ℓ. In each subpopulation j the numbers of individ-
uals ξjℓ traveling on each connection j → ℓ at time t define a set of stochastic variables which
follows the multinomial distribution
P({ξjℓ}) =
X
[m]
j !
(X[m]j −
∑
ℓ ξjℓ)!
∏
ℓ ξjℓ!
(1−
∑
ℓ
pjℓ)
(X[m]
j
−
∑
ℓ ξjℓ)
∏
ℓ
p
ξjℓ
jℓ , (8)
where (1 −
∑
ℓ pjℓ) is the probability of not traveling, and (X
[m]
j −
∑
ℓ ξjℓ) identifies the number
of non traveling individuals of the compartment [m]. We use standard numerical subroutines to
generate random numbers of travelers following these distributions. The transport operator in
each subpopulation j is therefore written as
Ωj([m]) =
∑
ℓ
(ξℓj(X
[m]
ℓ ) − ξjℓ(X
[m]
j )), (9)
where themean and variance of the stochastic variables are ⟨ξjℓ(X[m]j )⟩ = pjℓX[m]j andVar(ξjℓ(X[m]j )) =
pjℓ(1 − pjℓ)X
[m]
j . It is worth remarking that on average the airline network flows are balanced so
that the subpopulationNj are constant in time, e.g.
∑
[m]Ωj([m]) = 0. Direct flights as well as con-
necting flights up to two-legs flights can be considered. Connecting flights can be generated from
the original IATA data by applying a transport operator that redistribute passengers flying on a
one-step and two-steps flights, based on the fraction of passengers transiting at a given airport.
Values collected for this parameter and the full description of the transport operator including
connecting flights can be found in Ref. [5].
1.7 Time-scale separation and the integration of the commuting flows
The Global Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) modeler combines the infection dynamics with long-
and short-range human mobility. Each of these dynamical processes operates at a different time
scale. For ILI there are two important intrinsic time scales, given by the latency period ε−1 and
the duration of infectiousness µ−1, both larger than 1 day. The long-range mobility given by the
airline network has a time scale of the order of 1 day, while the commuting takes place in a time
scale of approx. τ−1 ∼ 1/3 day. The explicit implementation of the commuting in the model thus
requires a time interval shorter than the minimal time of airline transportation. To overcome this
problem, we use a time-scale separation technique, in which the short-time dynamics is integrated
into an effective force of infection in each subpopulation.
We start by considering the temporal evolution of subpopulations linked only by commuting
flows and evaluate the relaxation time to an equilibrium configuration. Consider the subpop-
ulation j coupled by commuting to other n subpopulations. The commuting rate between the
subpopulation j and each of its neighbors i will be given by σji. The return rate of commuting
individuals is set to be τ. Following the work of Sattenspiel and Dietz [9], we can divide the in-
dividuals original from the subpopulation j, Nj, between Njj(t) who are from j are located in j
at time t and those, Nji(t), that are from j are located in a neighboring subpopulation i at time t.
Note that by consistency
Nj = Njj(t) +
∑
i
Nji(t). (10)
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The rate equations for the subpopulation size evolution are then
∂tNjj = −
∑
i σjiNjj(t) + τ
∑
iNji(t) ,
∂tNji = σjiNjj(t) − τNji(t) .
(11)
By using condition (10), we can derive the closed expression
∂tNjj + (τ+ σj)Njj(t) = Njτ , (12)
where σj denotes the total commuting rate of population j, σj =
∑
i σji. Njj(t) can be expressed
as
Njj(t) = e
−(τ+σj)t
(
Cjj +Njτ
∫t
0
e(τ+σj)sds
)
, (13)
where the constant Cjj is determined from the initial conditions, Njj(0). The solution for Njj(t) is
then
Njj(t) =
Nj
(1+ σj/τ)
+
(
Njj(0) −
Nj
(1+ σj/τ)
)
e−τ(1+σj/τ)t . (14)
We can similarly solve the differential equation for the time evolution ofNji(t)
Nji(t) =
Njσji/τ
(1+ σj/τ)
−
σij
σj
(
Njj(0) −
Nj
(1+ σj/τ)
)
e−τ(1+σj/τ)t
+
[
Nji(0) −
Njσji/τ
(1+ σj/τ)
+
σij
σj
(
Njj(0) −
Nj
(1+ σj/τ)
)]
e−τt . (15)
The relaxation to equilibrium of Njj and Nji is thus controlled by the characteristic time [τ (1 +
σj/τ)]−1 in the exponentials. Such term is dominated by 1/τ if the relation τ ≫ σj holds. In our
case, σj =
∑
iωji/Nj, that equals the daily total rate of commuting for the population j. Such
rate is always smaller than one since only a fraction of the local population is commuting, and it
is typically much smaller than τ ≃ 3 − 10 day−1. Therefore the relaxation characteristic time can
be safely approximated by 1/τ. This time is considerably smaller than the typical time for the air
connections of one day and hence our approximation of considering the subpopulations Njj(t)
and Nji(t) as relaxed to their equilibrium values,
Njj =
Nj
1+ σj/τ
and Nji =
Njσji/τ
1+ σj/τ
, (16)
is reasonable. This approximation, originally introduced by Keeling and Rohani [10], allows us to
consider each subpopulation j as having an effective number of individualsNji in contact with the
individuals of the neighboring subpopulation i. In practice, this is similar to separate the commut-
ing time scale from the other time scales in the problem (disease dynamics, traveling dynamics,
etc.). While the approximation holds exactly only in the limit τ → ∞, it is good enough as long
as τ−1 is much smaller than the typical transition rates of the disease dynamics. In the case of
ILIs, the typical time scale separation between τ and the compartments transition rates is close
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to one order of magnitude or even larger. The Eqs. (16) can be then generalized in the time scale
separation regime to all compartments [m] obtaining the general expression
X
[m]
jj =
X
[m]
j
(1+ σj/τ)
and X[m]ji =
X
[m]
j
(1+ σj/τ)
σji/τ , (17)
where σj =
∑
i∈υ(j) σji denotes the total commuting rate of j. Whereas X
[m]
jj = X
[m]
j and X
[m]
ji = 0
for all the other compartments which are restricted from traveling. These expressions will be
used to obtain the effective force of infection taking into account the interactions generated by the
commuting flows.
1.8 Effective force of infection
The force of infection λj that a susceptible population of a subpopulation j sees can be decomposed
into two terms: λjj and λji. The component λjj refers to the part of the force of infection whose
origin is local in j. While λji indicates the force of infection acting on susceptibles of j during
their commuting travels to a neighboring subpopulation i. The effective force of infection can
be estimated by summing these two terms weighted by the probabilities of finding a susceptible
from j in the different locations, Sjj/Sj and Sji/Sj, respectively. Using the time-scale separation
approximation that establishes the equilibrium populations in Eq. (16), we can write
λj =
λjj
1+ σj/τ
+
∑
i
λjiσji/τ
1+ σj/τ
. (18)
Wewill focus now on the calculation of each term of the previous expression. The force of infection
occurring in a subpopulation j is due to the local infectious persons staying at j or to infectious
individuals from a neighboring subpopulation i visiting j and so we can write
λjj =
βj
N∗j
[
Intjj + I
t
jj + rβI
a
jj +
∑
i
(
Intij + I
t
ij + rβI
a
ij
)]
, (19)
where βj is introduced to account for the seasonality in the infection transmission rate (if the
seasonality is not considered, it is a constant), and N∗j stands for the total effective population in
the subpopulation j. By definition, Intjj = Intj and Intji = 0 for j ∕= i. If we use the equilibrium
values of the other infectious compartments (see Eq. (16)) we obtain
λjj =
βj
N∗j
[
Intj +
Itj + rβI
a
j
1+ σj/τ
+
∑
i
Iti + rβI
a
i
1+ σi/τ
σij/τ
]
. (20)
The derivation of λji follows from a similar argument yielding:
λji =
βi
N∗i
⎡⎣Intii + Itii + rβIaii + ∑
ℓ∈υ(i)
(
Intℓi + I
t
ℓi + rβI
a
ℓi
)⎤⎦ , (21)
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where υ(i) represents the set of neighbors of i, and therefore the terms under the sum are due to
the visits of infectious individuals from the subpopulations ℓ, neighbors of i, to i. By plugging the
equilibrium values of the compartment into the above expression, we obtain
λji =
βi
N∗i
⎡⎣Inti + Iti + rβIai1+ σi/τ + ∑
ℓ∈υ(i)
Itℓ + rβI
a
ℓ
1+ σℓ/τ
σℓi/τ
⎤⎦ . (22)
Finally, in order to have an explicit form of the force of infection we need to evaluate the effective
population size N∗j in each subpopulation j, i.e., the actual number of people actually staying at
the location j. The effective population is N∗j = Njj +
∑
iNij, that in the time-scale separation
approximation reads
N∗j = I
nt
j +
Nj − Intj
1+ σj/τ
+
∑
i
Ni − Inti
1+ σi/τ
σij/τ . (23)
Note that in these equations all the terms with compartments have an implicit time dependence.
By inserting λjj and λji into Eq. (18), it can be seen that the expression for the force of infection
includes terms of zeroth, first and second order on the commuting ratios (i.e., σij/τ). These three
term types have a straightforward interpretation: The zeroth order terms represent the usual force
of infection of the compartmental model with a single subpopulation. The first order terms ac-
count for the effective contribution generated by neighboring subpopulations with two different
sources: Either susceptible individuals of subpopulation j having contacts with infectious indi-
viduals of neighboring subpopulations i, or infectious individuals of subpopulations i visiting
subpopulation j. The second order terms correspond to an effective force of infection generated by
the contacts of susceptible individuals of subpopulation j meeting infectious individuals of sub-
population ℓ (neighbors of i) when both are visiting subpopulation i. This last term is very small
in comparison with the zeroth and first order terms, typically around two order of magnitudes
smaller, and in general can be neglected.
1.9 Seasonality modeling
In order to model the seasonality effect in the northern and in the southern hemispheres, we follow
the approach of Cooper et al [15] rescaling the basic reproduction ratio R0 by a sinusoidal function,
si (t),
si (t) =
1
2
[(
1−
αmin
αmax
)
sin
(
2π
365
(t− tmax,i) +
π
2
)
+ 1+
αmin
αmax
]
(24)
where i refers to the hemisphere considered. In the tropical region the scaling function is identi-
cally equal to 1.0. tmax,i is the time corresponding to the maximum of the sinusoid and hence to
the maximum of the effective R0, Rmax ≡ αmaxR0: it is fixed to Jan 15th in the northern hemi-
sphere and six months later in the southern one. Along the year the seasonality scaling function
varies from a maximum rescaling, αmax, to a minimum rescaling αmin. We have kept fixed αmax
to 1.1 [16], corresponding to a slight increase of R0, and tested different values of αmin from 0.1 to
0.9.
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1.10 Control sanitary measures in Mexico
During the early stages of the epidemic, Mexican authorities implemented, under the supervision
of WHO, a series of measures to increase social distance aimed at delaying the propagation of
influenza. These measures consisted in school and college closure, suspension of acts involving
people gathering such as concerts, masses, cinemas, etc, and the suspension for a few days of non
essential economic activities. The effect of these measures has been a reduction in the number of
cases reported between April 27th andMay 10th and a consequent damping in the incidence curve
that lasted at least until the beginning of June [17, 18].
The early stage evolution of the epidemic in Mexico is determinant for the world wide spread
of the infection, therefore the authorities intervention has been taken in consideration as an in-
gredient of the model. We have simulated the social distances setting a low value of the basic
reproductive ratio in Mexico, RMex0 , in the period between April 24th and May 10th, leaving out
in this case the seasonality rescaling. In the baseline scenario we have set RMex0 = 0.9.
2 Likelihood analysis
We performed a Monte Carlo maximum-likelihood estimation [19, 20] of the epidemic basic re-
productive number, R0. We fit with our model the arrival dates, t∗i , of the first infected individual
in each country i. Due to the media attention, the country arrival times are the highest quality
data among all the numbers regarding real epidemic cases and the least likely to be affected by
under-reporting. Given our statistical model, the probability of the empirical set of arrival times
{t∗i } conditioned to R0, when seen as a function of R0 itself, defines the likelihood function
ℒ (R0) = 풫 ({t∗i }|R0) . (25)
Maximizing this function, after fixing the values of the epidemiological and seasonality parame-
ters (ϵ, µ, αmin), we obtain an estimation of the basic reproductive number.
The probability distribution 풫 ({ti}|R0) is embedded in the stochastic epidemic spreading pro-
cess described by ourmodel. Therefore we use aMonte Carlo methodology to sample the distribu-
tion by generating numerically {ti}, for two thousand random realizations of the global epidemic
spreading. Each stochastic run of the model starting with the same initial conditions and the same
set of parameters (ϵ, µ, αmin) yields a simulated arrival time ti of the first symptomatic case de-
tected in a country not yet infected. Only symptomatic cases are considered, as asymptomatic
individuals would go undetected. The set of 2000 numerical observations of the arrival times ti
for each country i allows the definition of the discrete probability Pi(ti) as the fraction of runs
yielding arrival time ti. This procedure iterated for different values of R0 allows to reconstruct the
likelihood function ℒ (R0).
In order to facilitate the sampling of the distribution we have restricted the set of arrival times,
considering only the 12 countries (listed in Table 5) that have been seeded by Mexico both in the
real epidemic and in the simulated process (at least in the 90% of the cases). Indeed the infection
arrival dates in these countries are conditional statistical independent variables, being affected
only by the epidemic evolution in Mexico. Therefore in this case we can factorize 풫 ({ti}) in the
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Table 3: Maximum-likelihood estimates of the basic reproductive number, R0, varying the season-
ality factor, αmin, for the baseline scenario, ϵ−1 = 1.1 and µ−1 = 2.5.
αmin R0 [95%CI]
0.1 1.76 [1.65-1.87]
0.3 1.76 [1.65-1.87]
0.5 1.78 [1.66-1.90]
0.6 1.76 [1.64-1.88]
0.7 1.76 [1.64-1.88]
0.8 1.76 [1.65-1.87]
0.9 1.75 [1.63-1.87]
NS 1.76 [1.64-1.88]
product of the arrival time distributions for each single country
풫 ({ti}) =
∏
i
Pi(ti). (26)
An example of Pi(ti) is shown in Fig. 3; it is a well peaked, smooth distribution, which allows us
a good evaluation of the quantity Pi(t∗i ).
In Table 3 we report the estimates of the R0, and the corresponding confidence intervals, for the
baseline scenario and different values of αmin. Varying the seasonality scaling we obtain always
the same value of R0 within the errors. This result is due to the fact that almost the totality of
Mexico is in the tropical region and thus seasonality does not affect the epidemic dynamic within
this country and consequently neither the arrival times distribution. Therefore with this procedure
we are able to leave out the seasonality parameter and obtain an independent estimation of the
basic reproductive number.
3 Seasonality scaling
In order to obtain a rough estimation of the seasonality scaling factor, αmin, we have analyzed the
whole data set composed by the arrival dates of the first infected case in the 93 countries affected
by the outbreak as of June 18th. This list of countries, reported in Table 6, extends the set of the
12 countries considered for the R0 estimation in that we are interested in arrival times strongly
affected by seasonality. Both in the real and in the simulated process, many of these countries
are indeed seeded by the northern hemisphere where the dumping effect of seasonality had a
determinant influence on the epidemic dynamic in the period fromMarch to June spanned by our
data.
We analyzed the correlation between the simulated arrival time by country and its correspond-
ing empirical value, by measuring the regression coefficient (slope γ) between the two datasets.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the infection arrival times in the United States for the simulated spreading
process corresponding to the baseline. The red bar marks the empirical data.
For the simulated arrival times we considered median and 95%CI. γ was found to be sensitive to
variations in the seasonality scaling factor, allowing the discrimination of the value of αmin that
well fit the real epidemic, as the one having the slope closer to 1. For the baseline scenario, the
best correlation was found with αmin between 0.6 and 0.7 (the corresponding plots are reported
in Fig 4). Stronger and milder seasonalities lead respectively to a slower or faster epidemic pattern
in respect to epidemic data.
4 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis has been performed on the incubation and infectiousness periods, on the ap-
plication of control measures in Mexico and on the initial date of the epidemic as well as on the
empirical arrival date of infection in each country. In this section we illustrate all the different
scenarios we have considered. In Table 4 we report the maximum likelihood values of R0 with the
95%CI and the estimate of the αmin range obtained in each case, along with the resulting activity
peak times in the different regions.
All the scenarios presented in the following sections contain variations with respect to the
baseline case on one or more parameters, as follows. All the parameters are set to the baseline
scenario if not stated otherwise.
Seasonal transmission potential and activity peaks of the new influenza A(H1N1)...
D Balcan, H Hu, B Goncalves, P Bajardi, C Poletto
JJ Ramasco, D Paolotti, N Perra, M Tizzoni, W Van den Broeck, V Colizza, A Vespignani 14
04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
Empirical Data
04-01
05-01
06-01
07-01
08-01
09-01
Sim
ula
tio
ns
04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
Empirical Data
04-01
05-01
06-01
07-01
08-01
09-01
Sim
ula
tio
ns
γ = 1.09 
p = 7 10-16
αmin = 0.7αmin = 0.6
γ = 0.98 
p = 2 10-17
Figure 4: Simulated arrival times median and 95%CI versus the empirical ones for the two season-
ality scaling factor 0.6 and 0.7.
Table 4: Results of the sensitivity analysis. Maximum likelihood
value of R0 and 95%CI, best seasonality scenarios, and predicted
peak times in selected regions are shown.
Best R0 estimate Range of αmin World regions Activity peak time
and 95%CI [95%CI]
Shorter infectious period, µ−1 = 1.1 days
North America [Jul 25-Oct 22]
Western Europe [Aug 20-Nov 7]
1.42 [1.34-1.50] 0.8-0.9 Southeast Asia [Sept 11-Nov 9]
Upper South America [Jul 28-Sept 15]
Lower South America [Jul 28-Sept 13]
South Pacific [Jul 22-Sept 20]
Longer infectious period, µ−1 = 4 days
North America [Oct 19-Nov 15]
Western Europe [Oct 31-Nov 24]
2.11 [1.94-2.28] 0.45-0.55 Southeast Asia [Sept 2-Oct 21]
Upper South America [Jul 19-Aug 24]
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Lower South America [Jul 29-Aug 30]
South Pacific [Jul 28-Sept 9]
Longer latency period, epsilon−1 = 2.5 days (µ−1 = 3 days)
North America [Oct 26-Nov 18]
Western Europe [Nov 7-Nov 27]
2.31 [2.14-2.48] 0.4-0.5 Southeast Asia [Sep 7-Oct 24]
Upper South America [Jul 23-Aug 27]
Lower South America [Aug 3-Sep 2]
South Pacific [Aug 1-Sep 12]
Anticipated arrival time
North America [Nov 13-Dec 7]
Western Europe [Nov 17-Dec 6]
1.87 [1.73-2.01] 0.4-0.5 Southeast Asia [Aug 16-Oct 4]
Upper South America [Jul 4-Aug 4]
Lower South America [Jul 17-Aug 15]
South Pacific [Jul 15-Aug 24]
Later initial date
North America [Oct 30-Nov 25]
Western Europe [Nov 7-Nov 27]
1.89 [1.77-2.01] 0.45-0.55 Southeast Asia [Aug 25-Oct 12]
Upper South America [Jul 12-Aug 17]
Lower South America [Jul 22-Aug 21]
South Pacific [Jul 19-Sept 2]
Earlier initial date
North America [Aug 3-Oct 18]
Western Europe [Sept 1-Nov 6]
1.65 [1.54-1.77] 0.75-0.85 Southeast Asia [Sept 16-Nov 13]
Upper South America [Aug 1-Sept 17]
Lower South America [Aug 4-Sept 18]
South Pacific [Jul 28-Sept 25]
4.1 Exploration of the model parameters
We explored different values of the disease parameters in order to gain insight into the variability
in the optimal value of R0 and αmin and the effects that different values can have on the simula-
tions outcome. Three scenarios have been considered. In the first two cases we fixed the latency
period to ϵ−1 = 1.1 days and explored shorter and longer infectious period than the baseline
value, with µ−1 = 1.1 days and µ−1 = 4 days, respectively. The latter case explored a longer
latency periods than the baseline, ϵ−1 = 2.5 days, by fixing the infectious period at µ−1 = 3 days.
All results show that longer generation times (as obtained by increasing the latency period or the
infectious period) yield larger values of the maximum likelihood values of R0.
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A sensitivity on the value of αmax in the seasonality forcing (see the subsection 1.9) in the
range [1.0-1.1] provides a maximum likelihood value for R0 that does not differ from the baseline
value within its confidence interval, yielding R0=1.77 [95%CI: 1.66-1.88]. The range of seasonality
scenarios is very close to the one obtained for the baseline, with αmin in [0.65-0.75]. The studied
variation in the winter rescaling factor therefore does not affect the baseline scenario.
We also studied variations in the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals, rβ, from
20% to 80%, finding a maximum likelihood value of R0 that is within the confidence interval of the
baseline value in both cases. The obtained values are R0=1.77 [95%CI: 1.65-1.89] for rβ=20%, and
R0=1.77 [95%CI: 1.63-1.91] for rβ=80%.
4.2 Control sanitary measures in Mexico
As part of the sensitivity analysis, we have tested different values of RMex0 (see section 1.10). Values
of RMex between 0.5 and 1.2 [18] have been tested, with no relevant changes. The scenario inwhich
no sanitary measures have been applied, i.e. RMex0 ≡ R0 was also explored. While the maximum
likelihood value of R0 does not change within the error bars, yielding R0=1.75 [95%CI: 1.64-1.86],
αmin is decreased and is found in the range [0.45-0.55]. This result can be explained considering
that most of the 93 countries taken into account for the linear regression analysis are seeded either
from US or from Mexico. The detection of the seasonal effect relies on an interplay between the
number of cases exported by each of these two countries. With respect to the baseline scenario, a
higher effective R0 in Mexico determines more countries seeded from this country and less from
the US, which occurs with an enhanced seasonality.
4.3 Uncertainties in the chronological data
To assess the effects of the uncertainties in the chronological data, we have tested three different
scenarios. We have first anticipated of one week the empirical data of the infection arrival time in
each country. We consider indeed one week as the worst possible delay in the first case detection.
The shift of −7 days raised the best value of R0 to 1.87, a value that is still within the confidence
interval of the maximum likelihood value of the baseline case (see Table 3 for comparison).
In order to understand the effects of variations in the beginning of the epidemic, we have
simulated the scenarios in which the spreading starts one week later and one week earlier with
respect to the date provided by official sources and used in the baseline scenario. February 25th
and February 11th have been set as initial dates, respectively, in the two cases. As expected, the
delay of one week in the pandemic initial date results in a higher value of the reproductive number
with respect to the baseline scenario, with R0 =1.89 [95%CI: 1.77-2.01]. On the other hand, the
anticipation of the start of the epidemic results in lowering the value of R0 to 1.65 [95%CI: 1.54-
1.77], and moving the best values of αmin to 0.75− 0.85.
5 Chronology and data on the H1N1 worldwide spreading
In the table (5) the onset of symptoms, flight arrival and official confirmation dates are presented.
We focused on 12 countries seeded by Mexico for which we could find a clear description of the
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Table 5: Dates for the onset of symptoms, flight arrival and official confirmation of the first con-
firmed case in 12 countries seeded by Mexico are reported.
Country Onset of symptoms Flight arrival Confirmed on
United States March 28 [21] – April 21 [21]
Canada April 11 [22] April 8 [23] April 23 [24]
El Salvador – April 19 [25] May 3 [26]
United Kingdom April 24 [27] April 21 [28] April 27 [24]
Spain April 25 [29] April 22 [30] April 27 [24]
Cuba – April 25 [31] May 13 [24]
Costa Rica April 25 [32] April 25 [32] May 2 [24]
Netherlands – April 27 [33] April 30 [33]
Germany April 28 [34] – April 29 [24]
France – – May 1 [35]
Guatemala May 1 [36] – May 5 [37]
Colombia – – May 3 [38]
first confirmed case. When available, official data and reports were used. When the official sources
of information on a certain country were incomplete, we relied on news from the local press.
In the table (6) we show the complete timeline of confirmed cases for countries with at least one
case as of July 18. The reported date corresponds to the onset of symptoms. For those countries
where this information was not available, we report the flight arrival date or, when even this
information was not available, we display the official confirmation date.
Table 6: Timeline of the confirmed cases as of June 18
Country Confirmation Ref. Country Confirmation Ref.
Israel April 26 [39] New Zealand April 25 [40]
Austria April 17 [41] Switzerland April 29 [42]
Ireland April 30 [43] Denmark April 29 [44]
Hong Kong April 30 [45] Italy April 23 [46]
South Korea April 28 [47] Portugal April 30 [48]
Sweden May 6 [49] Argentina April 27 [50]
Poland May 5 [51] Japan May 8 [52]
Panama April 24 [53] Brazil May 8 [49]
Norway May 6 [54] Australia May 18 [55]
Finland May 6 [56] Mainland China May 9 [57]
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Thailand May 9 [58] Belgium May 11 [59]
Ecuador May 10 [60] Peru May 10 [61]
Malaysia May 13 [62] Turkey May 14 [63]
Chile May 16 [64] Honduras May 11 [65]
India May 16 [49] Greece May 17 [66]
Philippines May 18 [67] Russian Federation May 18 [68]
Paraguay May 20 [69] Iceland May 23 [70]
Kuwait May 23 [71] Lebanon May 23 [72]
Romania May 23 [73] Bolivia May 24 [74]
United Arab Emirates May 24 [75] Puerto Rico May 24 [76]
Singapore May 24 [77] Bahrain May 25 [78]
Czech Republic May 25 [79] Venezuela May 25 [80]
Hungary May 26 [81] Vietnam May 26 [82]
Bulgaria May 27 [83] Dominican Republic May 27 [84]
Estonia May 27 [85] Uruguay May 27 [86]
Slovakia May 28 [87] Bahamas May 29 [88]
Cayman Islands May 29 [89] Cyprus May 29 [90]
Saudi Arabia May 29 [91] Ukraine May 29 [92]
Jamaica May 31 [93] Egypt June 1 [94]
Luxembourg June 1 [95] Nicaragua June 1 [96]
Bermuda June 2 [97] Trinidad and Tobago May 30 [98]
Barbados June 3 [99] Dominica June 5 [100]
French Polynesia June 5 [101] Morocco June 10 [102]
Yemen June 13 [103] Oman June 13 [104]
Qatar June 13 [105] South Africa June 14 [106]
Suriname June 14 [107] Papua New Guinea June 15 [108]
Jordan June 15 [109] Western Samoa June 15 [110]
Solomon Islands June 15 [111] Sri Lanka June 16 [112]
British Virgin Islands June 17 [113] Macau June 17 [114]
Netherlands Antilles June 17 [115] Bangladesh June 18 [116]
Lao Peoples Rep June 18 [117]
6 Hospitalization
The ratio between hospitalized individual and confirmed cases is probably an overestimation of
the hospitalization rate (HR) because of the under-ascertainment of the real infected individu-
als. Furthermore, the HR shows large fluctuations from one country to another due to different
monitoring systems and containment policies. As a baseline, we consider an HR=10% [118], as
calculated from confirmed cases for the United States. According to ref [119] a more realistic HR
can be estimated using the multiplier method. Since the number of infected individuals has been
Seasonal transmission potential and activity peaks of the new influenza A(H1N1)...
D Balcan, H Hu, B Goncalves, P Bajardi, C Poletto
JJ Ramasco, D Paolotti, N Perra, M Tizzoni, W Van den Broeck, V Colizza, A Vespignani 19
Table 7: Weekly new cases (thousands): comparison between reported cases and simulation re-
sults.
Week Simulated [95%CI] Reported [10x− 30x]
USA
May 10 - May 16 [0.03-11.91] 2.46 [26.60-73.80]
Jun 7 - Jun 13 [1.32-152.48] 4.64 [46.38-139.14]
Jul 5 - Jul 11 [32.16-1031.36] 3.26 [32.63-97.89]
UK
May 10 - May 16 [0.00-0.32] 0.05 [0.53-1.59]
Jun 7 - Jun 13 [0.02-4.35] 0.59 [5.93-17.79]
Jul 5 - Jul 11 [0.49-29.74] 2.29 [22.93-68.79]
AUSTRALIA
May 10 - May 16 [0.00-2.84] 0.42 [4.21-12.63]
Jun 7 - Jun 13 [0.00-151.91] 1.58 [15.77-47.31]
Jul 5 - Jul 11 [0.28-2263.80] 4.58 [45.84-137.52]
estimated to be 10-30 times larger than laboratory-confirmed cases, the HR can be calculated from
real data by taking into account this scaling factor. In table 3 of the main paper values obtained for
these HR are shown and compared with the one for a typical seasonal flu [120] [121].
7 Comparison of simulation results and real data
We compare the simulation results obtained for the baseline case with the reported data of a se-
lection of countries. Table 7 shows the weekly new number of cases (expressed in thousands) for
a set of three dates from early May to the end of July, for the United States, the United King-
dom, and Australia. The ranges in the simulated results correspond to the 95% CI obtained
from the baseline simulations. Along with the number of reported cases, obtained from official
sources [123, 124, 125, 126], we also report an interval calculated assuming a multiplier method
of 10 and 30 times the confirmed cases. Results show an enhanced surveillance during the early
phase of the outbreak, followed by a progressive decrease of the monitoring capacity. The larger
number of cases made it indeed increasingly difficult to closely monitor the epidemic by con-
firming cases, and reporting requirements changed for countries that experienced an early out-
break [122].
Figure 5 reports the comparison of the epidemic evolution in 4 Territories of Australia – West-
ern Australia, New South Wales, Queensland, and Northern Territory. The cumulative number of
reported cases by Territory [126] (red circles) is compared to the corresponding predicted values,
as indicated by the 95% CI (gray area). The plots show a good agreement between the empirical
curves and the predicted behaviors, with the reported data being within the confidence interval of
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Figure 5: Comparison of reported (red circles) vs. simulated cases (95%CI indicated by the gray
area) for a selection of 4 Territories of Australia. The simulations correctly predicts the different
temporal evolutions observed in distinct Territories, as induced by the mobility of individuals.
The vertical dashed lines indicate the delay of the start of the outbreak observed in two different
Territories.
the simulations. Most importantly, the simulations are able to reproduce the heterogeneous geo-
temporal pattern observed in the Australian Territories, where the outbreak started at different
times. As an example, we report the time at which the first cluster of cases was detected in New
South Wales and in Queensland, as indicated by the vertival dashed lines. The delay of approxi-
mately 2 weeks between the two outbreaks is correctly predicted by the simulations that take into
account the mobility of individuals within the country (from actual commuting data) and with
abroad.
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